Shaw V Reno Ap Gov Definition
The difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should be examined less under the equality clause than other state laws that classify citizens by race. Moreover, it seems clear to us that sometimes proving it will not be difficult at all. In exceptional cases, a redistribution plan may be so irregular that it cannot be rationally interpreted as anything other than an attempt at separation” [509 U.S. 630, 15]. Voters” on the basis of race. Gomillion, op. cit. cit., p. 341. Gomillion, in which a tortured municipal boundary was drawn to exclude black voters, was one such case. This also applies to cases where a state concentrates a dispersed minority in a single district by ignoring traditional district principles such as compactness, adjacency and respect for political divisions.
We stress that these criteria are important not because they are constitutionally required – they are not, cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752, n. 18 (1973) – but because they are objective factors that can be used to refute the claim that a county has been manipulated on racial grounds. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., agreed) (“Stewart J.`s classic definition of obscenity—`I know it when I see it`—need not be used as the ultimate standard for determining the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that radically irregular forms may have sufficient probative value to require explanation” (footnotes omitted)). Gomillion agrees with this view. First of all, it is curious that the Court relies on this case as the source of its innovative action.
Judge Frankfurter described the trial as an allegation of disenfranchisement in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. See 364 U.S., pp. 341-346. Whether this description is accurate or not, see ante, paragraph 13, it seriously devalues the precedent that the majority wants to set for Gomillion: In my view, the case cannot support the proposition that the deliberate creation of majoritarian-minority districts easily raises the same protection issue under the Fourteenth Amendment. But even reinterpreted as a case of the Fourteenth Amendment, Gomillion does not support the majority, as he focused on the alleged effect of the city`s action to exclude black voters from Tuskegee Township. As the Court noted, “the inevitable effect of this redrawing of Tuskegee`s borders” was to “discriminately deprive black applicants of the benefits of remaining in Tuskegee”. 364 U.S., at 341. Even Justice Whittaker`s approval appears to be based on the notion that Black citizens were “excluded” from community services.
Id., p. 349. Subsequent decisions of this court have also interpreted Gomillion to address the unconstitutional effect of the law. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O`Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968). In short, in Gomillion [509 U.S.
630, 12], the group that formed the majority at the state level allegedly proceeded to manipulate city limits to eliminate members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable community services. In this case, no comparable object or effect has been invoked. An allegation that the rezoning regime has a discriminatory intent and effect to distinguish itself from a claim that has nothing to do with the distinction between “benign” and malicious racial classifications – an undertaking that, as the majority notes, has been treated with skepticism by the Court. See ante, point 11. Rather, the question is whether classification on the basis of race discriminates against an individual by denying him or her equal access to the political process. Even those members of the Court least inclined to approve racist appeals recognized the importance of this factor. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 , [509 U.S. 630, 7] 524-525, n. 3 (1980) (Stewart, J., different) (“No person in [UJO] has been removed from his or her right to vote”); Regents of the Univ. by Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) (“United Jewish Organizations. is considered a case where the remedy in the event of an administrative finding of discrimination includes measures to improve the participation of the previously disadvantaged group, without preventing persons belonging to another group from taking advantage of the relevant opportunity – meaningful participation in the electoral process” (emphasis added). In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), the Fifteenth Amendment Court struck down a law that imposed a literacy requirement on voters, but included a “grandfather clause” that applied to individuals and their descendants in the direct line who were entitled to vote “on or before January 1, 1866.” Id., p. 357 (inner quotation marks omitted).
The crucial consideration for the Court was that, although the law was purported to be racially neutral, on its face “embodied no exercise of judgment and was not based on any apparent reason” other than circumvention of the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., p. 363. In other words, the law was invalid because, at first glance, it could not be explained for reasons other than race. The majority tries to distinguish UJO by imagining a previously unknown constitutional claim. According to her, the UJO has set a standard that white voters can find unconstitutional dilution of votes. Nothing in the decision prevents white voters (or voters of a different race) from making the analytically unequivocal assertion that a redistribution plan cannot rationally be interpreted as anything other than an attempt to separate citizens into separate districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. Ante, with 21. That distinction is not supported by UJO, nor is there jurisdiction in the cases cited by the Court. More importantly, the majority`s argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The logic of their theory seems to be that conscious redistricting of race, which “separates” by drawing lines of strange shape, is qualitatively different from conscious redistricting of race, which affects groups in other ways. The distinction is totally unfounded.
[ Footnote 3 ] The majority does not recognize that we require such a declaration from applicants who make an application for dilution of voting rights under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In the three-part test of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986), a minority group must demonstrate that it can form a majority in a one-man district, that it is “politically consistent,” and “that the white majority as a bloc votes enough to make this possible. usually to defeat the preferred candidate of the minority. At least these last two conditions depend on the evidence that what the Court now calls “unconscionable racist stereotypes” is true at age 16.